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NEW REFORMS.
BY FREDERICK M.4Y HOLLAND.
Victor Hugo was led by sympathy with criminals
to treat them as victims of society ; and a recent
writer in the New Ideal is in favor of the complete
abolition of government, because, " If we had no gov-
ernments, criminals would not be created." We are
also told that all oppression of wives would cease, if
matrimonial contracts were made so easy of dissolu-
tion, that there would, strictly speaking, be no mar-
riage at all. Still, other enthusiasts assure us that all
the woes of poverty are to be removed by doing away
with individual ownership of land, or better still, with
' all private propert)', whatever.
Such reforms are advocated with the best possible
intentions, and make many converts. Young and
imaginative people, who find attempts to reform the
tariff, the civil service, or the elections too tame and
prosaic to be worth their notice, are delighted with
these romantic schemes for abolishing all poverty and
vice at a single blow. Nothing could be more fascin-
ating and picturesque than these : no propert}', no
marriage and no government reforms. No method
could certainly be more radical than this of complete-
ly abolishing every institution which has dangerous
tendencies. There is a sublime consistency in reject-
ing the plea that this or that obnoxious institution is
necessary to civilization, and saying, "So much the
worse for civilization ! That is precisely what ought
to be abolished ! If property, government, and mar-
riage are necessary to the present civilization, the
sooner we can get back to an earlier, simpler and
more natural state of things, the better ! Let us go
back to primeval innocence, and do away with all that
is artificial and corrupt! "
The advantages of this method of reform are self-
evident,_and my present purpose is simpl}' to apply it
to fields which have hitherto been neglected.
We all know that tight lacing brings on consump-
tion, and many other diseases; that severe colds are
often caught b}' forgetting garments to whose protec-
tion we have been accustomed ; that deadly diseases
are carried about in infected apparel ; and that the
fashionable form of female attire hinders women from
taking sufficient exercise in the open air, especially on
wet or windy days. It is true that warm clothes pre-
serve many deformed and sickly people from dying
young
; but this enables them to propagate defects
which would otherwise perish with them ; and thus
the average health of the community is reduced sadly.
The Indians were able to lead a thoroughly healthy
life here without anything which we should call cloth-
ing. Adam and Eve were naked and not ashamed.
The first men and women had no need of doctors, for
they had no tailors or milliners. What can be plainer
than that clothing causes disease ? In the name of
health, I demand the organization of a No Clothes
movement. Let us make a bold push for corporeal in-
dependence on the next Fourth of July. No consid-
eration of decency need stand in the way ; for that is
merely conventional. Pride, vanity, and extravagance
would be greatly checked ; and there would be much
less quarreling of husbands with their wives. The
abundance of models would give sculpture and paint-
ing such new power as would elevate and purify all
social life. Rich and poor would meet as equals,
until the reduction in cost of living caused all poverty
to vanish. What could be more heavenly and at the
same time more natural and primitive?
And, as I look back admiringly upon that picture
of health and model of all the virtues, the primitive
man, who was as nobly free from clothing as from
government, private property, or marriage, I delight
to remember how completely he satisfied the apostolic
ideal. "If any man offend not in word," says James
in his epistle, "the same is a perfect man, and able
also to bridle the whole body." No one has ever
done this so successfully as the primitive man, the
missing link. We can be sure that he never swore,
nor lied, nor scolded, nor tattled, nor talked obscene-
ly. Nothing is more certain than that he could not
talk at all. Speech, like clothing, marriage, govern-
ment, and private ownership, is an artificial corrup-
tion, a desertion of primeval innocence. Oh, how
many vices can be escaped by starting a No Conver-
sation reform, as holy monks have tried to do.
There is no other way in which Ij'ing, swearing, scold-
ing and all other sins of the tongue can be abolished.
I will claim no more space here for setting forth my
own favorite reforms. No Clothes and No Conversa-
tion; but will merely assure my readers that these
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new movements are destined to triumph quite as soon
and do just as much good as those for no marriage, no
property and no government.
THE HIDDEN SELF.
BY ALICE BODINGTON.
The researches of M. Ribot and M. Binet into the
strange phenomena of secondary consciousness, are
well known to the readers of The Open Court. Those
of M. Janet, in the same field, are also profoundly in-
teresting, and the conclusions he has arrived at are
the results of long years of investigation. I have se-
lected a few of his observations and experiments, and
have added information from other sources which have
a bearing on the same problem.
Under normal conditions we are conscious only of
the impressions received by the highest cerebral hemi-
spheres. But in healthy persons under the influence
of hypnotism ; in some well-known epileptic condi-
tions ; and in simple and double hypnotism of diseased
persons,, "submerged consciousnesses" reveal them-
selves, and become for the time the "Ego." It is
probable that further researches will confirm the hy-
pothesis that these submerged consciousnesses, these
"hidden selves " are always actively at work, and take
upon themselves those manifold occupations with
which the highest Self concerns itself very little, after
having learned how to do them. The acquisition of the
arts of walking, reading, writing; of playing on mu-
sical instruments, and acquiring foreign languages, all
demand careful attention on the part of the highest
centres in their acquirement, but are capable of being
carried out, when acquired, in what we have been ac-
customed to call an "automatic" manner. Even the
art of lying safely on a bedstead is acquired, and not
very quickly either.
In many well-known cases of epilepsy recorded in
Medical Journals, the patient has carried out a long,
and to all appearance, perfectly rational course of ac-
tion ; has lost consciousness on a quay of the Seine
or in a street of New York, and has "come to him-
self " in a hotel far removed from the scene of his at-
tack. He has taken his ticket, traveled by train, taken
a cab, named the hotel to which he wished to be driven
;
paid bills when presented to him, and has behaved in
every respect as a reasoning being ; yet of the whole
series of transactions so far as his ordinary "Ego " is
concerned, he remembers nothing since he was last on
the quay or in the street. Terrible crimes, most in-
human in their deadly callousness and ferocity, have
been committed in this epileptic condition, yet the
conscious self of the unhappy perpetrator would have
shrunk with horror from such deeds.
The "nightmare" of children seems also to come
within the domain of the "hidden self." The child
utters cries indicative of the utmost terror and dis-
tress ; sits up in bed or wanders about the room
;
stares at vacancy, ^et is utterly unconscious of the
anxious friends who are endeavoring to soothe it. One
of these crises may occur everj' night for a lengthened
period. Yet when the sufferer is roused, he—or she
—
has no recollection of having dreamed anything, or of
anything having been the matter.
In the phenomena of "post-hypnotic suggestion "
the wonder has been how the command to execute a
certain action, or to see a certain imaginary person,
should always be obeyed at the exact day and hour
that has been suggested. It appears from M. Janet's
experiments that the "hidden self"—the inferior con-
sciousness— is busy all the time with remembering the
command, has in fact nothing else to do. In one of
those curious cases of a true blister caused by hypnotic
suggestion, the subject when again hypnotized said,
"J'ai tout le temps pense a votre sinapisme ; " that
is, the submerged self was ceaselessly occupied with
the suggestion, whilst the conscious self did not re-
member that any such suggestion had been made.
More than a generation ago the late George Henry
Lewes commented on the extraordinary fact (as it has
seemed till now) that the leg is drawn up when tickled,
of a patient in whom the spinal cord is injured, and
who is therefore "unconscious" of the tickling. Mr.
Lewes declared that there must be consciousness in such
a case, or the limb would not be withdrawn. His
theory met with little but ridicule ; he was met by the
answer, " There can be no consciousness, without self
-
consciousness." Those, like myself, who were not the
least satisfied with this answer, had no hope whatever
of being able to furnish a.ny proof oi a sub-conscious-
ness residing in the spinal cord below the seat of in-
jury. We had no hope of finding proofs of subcon-
sciousness in the complicated and purposive move-
ments of the brainless frog. "Reflex action" might
cause movements like those of a bell when the wire is
pulled, but not one thought the complex movements
with a purpose, or what would certainly have been
considered as complex movements with a purpose in
an uninjured frog. It has now been proved that other
consciousnesses exist and are actively at work besides
the dominating ego ; consciousnesses which carry on
reflex actions, and also actions which have become re-
flex. The highest of these consciousnesses appears
capable of all but the highest functions, and can re-
ceive a fair elementary education. In The Century
magazine for May, a well-known case is mentioned of
a "young girl, quick, active, and full of life and ani-
mation, who suddenly complained one day of a severe
headache, and lay down on the bed. She became un-
conscious, but awoke in a few moments conscious,
although no longer the being she had been. She did
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not know her father, mother, brothers, and sisters
;
the results of years of education had been annihilated.
She knew no more of her native tongue than does the
child just born. . . . She had to be educated over
again. She lived her life, learned her lessons, until
she could read and write and knew her friends once
more. Suddenly the headache came again upon her,
and a deep ' sleep ' fell over her. She again woke up
to the old being ; the language acquired in infancy
had returned to her; the facts learned through long
years were with her ; the acquaintances of old times
were her friends. The acquaintances, the lessons
learned, the facts and events of the second period she
knew no more. So she went on until again the head-
ache returned, the 'sleep' was again on her, and she
awoke again her second self. At the very page at
which her education had been interrupted in the sec-
ond state it was now taken up. She recognized the
friends of the second state, but knew none of the first.
So through years she lived on her double life, now
one person, now another ; each state being connected
with, or rather being a continuation of, the previous
corresponding state."
This case has many parallels, in some of which
there is not only one submerged ego, capable of act-
ing when the highest ego is suppressed, but two or
three or more of these inferior consciousnesses, each
carrying on its separate life. M. Janet gives details
of the case of a patient whom he calls Leonie i, L6onie
2, and Leonie 3, according to the consciousness which
is in action ; the second self, however, rejects the
name Leonie, and answers to that of L^ontine ; and
the third self knows herself as Ldonore. The true
Leonie is a serious, mild, quiet peasant woman, and
very timid. But Leontine is vivacious, noisy and
restless, and given to irony and sharp jesting. She
knows of Leonie, and says (the real Leonie has a hus-
band and children) that the husband belongs to "the
other," but the children are hers. This curious dis-
tinction is explained by the fact that she had been
hypnotized for her first confinements, and had lapsed
spontaneously into the hypnotic condition in the later
ones.
Leonie 3, "Leonore," knows, strange to say, of
both the others. L6onie i, she calls "a good but
rather stupid woman and not me." She is serious
and grave, speaks slowl)', and moves little, and she
despises the volatile character of L(§onie 2. "How
can you see anything of me in that crazy creature?"
she says ; " Fortunately I have nothing to do with her 1"
There are terrible cases where the "Mr. Hyde,"
the "bete humaine " of the individual, has got alto-
gether the upper hand ; where hell— if it be a state of
consciousness—has begun upon earth. Here science
steps in, and with merciful hand keeps the ' bete hu-
maine'—alas! in these instances identical with what
should be the highest ego,
—
permanently submerged.
Women of bad character, of ferocious temper, and the
prey of nameless vices, are by persistent hypnotism
rendered useful members of society, acting as ser-
vants and hospital nurses.
The case, most interesting in its bearing on the cure
of the insane, and in its exemplification of the best side
of medical hypnotism, is that of a patient of M. Janet,
named "Marie." She was but nineteen when she
came under his care. Her condition seemed almost
desperate ; she had convulsive crises every month,
chill, fever, delirium, attacks of terror, etc., lasting
for days ; with various shifting anaesthesias and con-
tractures. After a lapse of seven months she fell into
a kind of despair ; and M. Janet as a last resource
tried to throw her into a deeper trance,—ordinary
hypnotism having no effect. He succeeded even be-
yond his expectations; for both her early memories
and the internal memory of her crises returned in the
deep somnambulism. Her periodical chill, fever, and
delirium were due to a foolish immersion of herself in
cold water at the age of thirteen. The chill, fever,
etc., were consequences that then ensued; and now
years later, the experience then stamped upon the
brain was repeating itself at ?-egular intervals in the
form of an hallucination undergone by the sub-conscious
self, and of which the primary personality only ex-
perienced the outer results. The attacks of terror
were accounted for by another shocking experience.
At the age of sixteen she had seen an old woman
killed by falling from a height, and the sub-conscious-
ness endured the repetition of this experience when
the other crises came on. The hysterical blindness
of her left eye had a similar origin ; when six years
old, in spite of her cries, she was forced to sleep in the
same bed with another child, the left half of whose face
bore a disgusting eruption. The result was an erup-
tion on the same parts of her own face, which re-
turned for several years before it disappeared utterly,
and left behind it an anaesthesia of the skin and the
blindness of the left eye.
M. Janet's object was to obliterate these halluci-
nations of the submerged self, which were the causes
of such terrible distress. Simple commands were
fruitless. M. Janet carried the poor girl back to the
period of her childhood. It was easy to persuade her
that she was again a child, and as a child she was led
through the painful scenes of her past life, only they
were given a different denouement. The child with
whom she had been forced to sleep was represented
as no longer horrible, but as a charming little creature
whom Marie caressed without fear. He also made
her re-enact the scene of the cold immersion, but gave
it a different result. He made her live again through
26o6 THK OPKN COURT.
the old woman's accident, but substituted a comical
issue for the old tragical end which had made so deep
an impression. The sub-conscious Marie, passive
and docile, adopted these new versions of the old
tales, and may now be either living in monotonous
contemplation of them, or they may be extinct alto-
gether. For all morbid symptoms ceased as if by
magic. "It is iive months," says M.Janet, "since
these experiments were performed. Marie shows no
longer the slightest symptoms of hysteria. She is
well, and in particular has grown quite stout. Her
physical aspect has absolutely changed. Moreover,
she is no longer hypnotizable."
In another case of severe hysterical vomiting, M.
Janet has found it necessary to keep the patient con-
stantly in the hypnotic state.
That the submerged consciousnesses are real con-
sciousnesses, and not mere manifestations of reflex
action, has already been abundantly proved. If any-
thing can indicate an independent ego, it must surely
be the capacity of writing a letter spontaneously.
This was done by the second self of L6onie, who
knows herself as ' Li^ontine. '* L^onie had left the
hospital at Havre about two months when M. Janet
received a singular letter. On the first page was a
short note signed with her real name "Femme
B . . ." saying she had been feeling very unwell, and
worse some days than others. But on the next page
was a very different production. " My dear good Sir,"
it said, " I must tell you that L^onie truly, truly causes
me great suffering, she cannot sleep ; she does me a
great deal of harm ; I shall do for her (/> vats la
deinolii-) she puts me out of all patience ; I am ill too,
and very tired. From your devoted Leontine." When
L6onie returned to Havre, M. Janet questioned her
about this twin letter; she remembered the first part
w.ell, but knew nothing of Ldontine's sequel. Subse-
quently M. Janet was able to watch the production
of these sub-conscious and spontaneously written let-
ters. One day L^onie was sitting calmly by a table
holding in one hand a piece of knitting at which she
had been working. Her face was very calm, and she
was singing a peasant's song in a low voice. In the
meantime the right hand was writing quickly. "I took
away the paper," says M. Janet, "without her notic-
ing it and I spoke to her. She seemed a little sur-
prised to see me, said she had spent the day knitting,
and had been singing because she thought herself
alone." She had no knowledge whatever of the paper
she had written. In subsequent letters the 'second
self Leontine showed both intelligence and an ex-
cellent memory; she gave an account of Ldonie's
childhood, and her remarks were full of good sense.
L(5onie had a habit of tearing up the papers that
* UAutomatisme Psychologique, pp. 320-322.
' Leontine ' had written. Thereupon in one of Leo-
nie's fits of absence of mind (distraction) she made
her take the letter and hide it in a certain photo-
graphic album which contained the portrait of a M.
Gibert, whom Ldonie hated and dreaded. She would
never therefore consciously open this album, and here
'Ldontine ' knew her precious papers would be safe.
It must be borne in mind that these manifestations of
the second self did not occur in the hypnotic state.
M. Janet, to his great astonishment, found that Leo-
nie did not know his address, nor did she know how
or why she had gone to Havre ; Leontine was in a
hurry to return to the hospital, and had made L^onie
start off without any luggage.
BE CONCLUD
THE AUTHORITY OF THE MORAL LAW.
Conscience is not so much an authority itself, as
it is representative of an authority. It represents the
authority of the moral law in the world, which is no less
a reality than all the other natural laws. Mr. Salter
in a most enthusiastic lecture on the higher law con-
taining much that is true, asks the question :
" Whence comes the authority of this law that is within and
over us ?
"
Mr. Salter continues :
" The ordinary answers seem to me here entirely to fail ....
the last answer as to the sources of the authority of the higher law
fails as truly as the first. In fact there is no answer ; there are
no sources for that supreme authority."
The Israelites conceived the authority of the moral
law, the power that makes for righteousness, under
the allegory of a powerful ruler of nature, as a great,
personal being, as a legislator who had revealed his
wise orders to Moses. And through the mouth of
Moses, the God of the Old Testament is said to have
characterized himself in the following words :
'
' I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of
the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation
of them that hate me ; and showing mercy unto thousands of thera
that love me, and keep my commandments."
That God is jealous means he is intolerant. He
enforces his will and suffers no one to live who at-
tempts permanently to resist his will.
The God of Science is just as jealous, just as in-
tolerant as the God of the Old Testament. The laws
of nature are firm, unalterable, irrefragable, and omni-
potent. The will of God is described to be " stead-
fast forever," and his dominion over the world* is
proclaimed to be eternal. It is only by obedience
to the immutable laws of nature that we can live. The
Psalmist says :
"Unless thy law had been my delights, I should then have
perished in mine affliction." (119, 92.)
Who can doubt that nature enforces her laws rigor-
* Daniel 6, 26.
i
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ously, that she ruthlessly punishes him who does not
regard them, but that, on the other hand, (to use the
poetical phrase of the Bible,) she is "plenteous in
mercy " to him who loves her, who studies her secrets
and obeys her commandments? Certainly, the laws
of nature are not deities, and the moral order of the
world is not a person. But they are, nevertheless, ob-
jective realities just the same.
We have ceased to believe in Demeter, but we
have not ceased tilling the ground. And if we ask,
Who is it that taught man to till the ground ? we
do not hesitate to answer, "It is experience; the facts
of life have taught man to sow and to harvest the
fruits of the earth." The myth of Demeter is not
wrong, it is simply an allegory ; and the myth of a
personal God having spoken to Moses out of a fiery
bush contains great truths, but we must bear in mind
that the truths contained in the Mosaic religion are
wrapped in poetry. And science can just as much
explain -ethics and the rhoral law, and the authority
of moral obligations, as it can derive the rules of
agriculture from the facts of nature.
It is true as Mr. Salter says, "Science teaches us
that which is, but Ethics that which ought to be.
"
But that which ought to be, must be based upon that
which is ; else it will not stand.
What is the ought ? The ought is that into which
the is has the tendency to change. It is the is to be.
A Unitarian friend of mine compares in this re-
spect ethics to obstetrics. Ethics cannot at individual
pleasure create ideals of morality, all it can do is to
find out the tendency of life and to assist in bringing
the is to be to birth. The authority upon which ethics
is based, he says, is not a person, but we can repre-
sent it as a person. We can symbolize its activity as if
it consisted of personal actions, and that is the method
by which the various religions teach ethics.
In fine, the authority according to which moral
ideals must be shaped, is not subjective, but objec-
tive. It is not to be sought for in the realms of abso-
lute principles, but must be modeled in conformity
with existing facts and with the eternal laws that
science abstracts from existing facts.
Ethical ideals that are not based on facts, are like
the mirage in the desert. The mirage maybe more
beautiful than the oasis, but he goes astray who ven-
tures to follow it.
THE THREE PHASES OF ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT.
There are three phases or periods in the ethical
development of mankind. Like all phases of evolution
they are not sharply divided ; one passes over into the
next gradually. Their development is nevertheless
sufficiently marked to be noticeable.
The first period begins with the dawn of civilized
life and culminates in the establishment of authorita-
tive dogmatism. The transition to the second period
is marked by the breakdown of this authoritative dog-
matism. The second period is the substitution of the
individual conscience in the place of dogmatism. It
culminates in the recognition of the sovereignty of the
moral ought, and of the freedom of conscience. The
transition to the third period is the result of the con-
flicts produced by the arbitrary nature of the vari-
ous conceptions of duty.
If man's conscience is to be considered as the ul-
timate court of appeal we can have no objective
standard of right and wrong. That which is wrong
according to my conscience, may be right according
to the conscience of others. How shall we decide ?
It is obvious that we want an objective standard of
morality. Without an objective standard of morality
we shall sink into moral anarchy, where the will of
the individual is the sole test of what is right or wrong.
Accordingly ethics is in need of an authority to
decide the conflict between two consciences or the
conflict between two different commands in the con-
science of one and the same man.
Must we return to the old dogmatism of the first
period? We shall not; for we have outgrown mythol-
ogy, and shall never return to the creeds of the old
religions. But we need not think of returning to the
old views, we can progress to a higher view. We have
now better means than our ancestors had for recog-
nizing the authority upon which the moral ought rests.
Our knowledge of nature and of the laws of nature
has grown sufficiently for us to be able to account for
the necessity as well as the natural growth of morality.
The authority upon which the moral commands are
based can be scientifically investigated and explained
no less than the other facts of nature.
The first period is represented by the Mosaic law, by
Roman Christianity, and similar institutions of author-
itative dogmatism. The second period is represented
by certain phases and ideals of the Reformation, the
overthrow of Roman authority, and the recognition of
the liberty of conscience. The third period is the re-
ligion of the future, which is near at hand. It is the
basing of ethics upon the firm ground of facts. It
is the recognition of an authority the nature of which
can be explained by science. It is the establishment
of the religion of science.
This religion of science is not only the fulfilment
of the old religions; it is also the realization of that
ideal which has been called natural religion. If the
societies for ethical culture had been founded to rep-
resent this view, they would grow like the mustard
seed ; the seed would soon be the greatest among
herbs and become a tree so that the birds of the air
would come and lodge in the branches thereof.
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Mr. Salter does not approve of what he calls "set-
ting up a standard of philosophical orthodoxy. " He
says :
" Dr. Carus, I am sorry to see, has not outgrown the secta-
rian principle of the churches, and would apparently give us
another sect as ' exclusive ' and ' intolerant ' as any of the past,
though (Gottlob) it will slay with the sword of the spirit and not
with the arm of flesh."
It lies in the nature of ethics to establish an au-
thority, and every authority is in a certain sense ex-
clusive and intolerant. An ethical teacher, in my
mind, cannot help being "exclusive" and "intolerant,"
if "intolerant" means the confidence that there is
but one truth. Or shall any kind of ethics have the
same right? Can anybody violate a law if only his
conscience impels him to ignore that law? and can
truth be tolerant of error ? or can we have different
kinds of truth which, although contradictory, among
themselves may be of equal value ?
The ideal of tolerance (as the word is commonly
used) means that we use no other weapons in the de-
fense of our opinion than the sword of the spirit, but it
does not mean that any and every error has the same
right as demonstrable truths.
It would be intolerant to make a certain belief the
condition for being admitted to a religious society
;
but it is not intolerant for anybody, neither for so-
cieties nor for individuals, to have a definite and out-
spoken opinion. Nor would the leaders of the Ethical
Societies commit themselves to intolerance and ex-
clusiveness by declaring what they understand by
ethics. We maintain that they cannot properly teach
ethics without knowing what ethics means. In order
to know what ethics means, they must define the idea
of moral goodness, and they cannot define the idea of
moral goodness without proposing a basis of ethics.
If that is intolerant sectarianism, they have in our
opinion to become intolerant sectarians. But definite-
ness of opinion is neither intolerance nor sectarian-
ism, so long as an opinion remains exposed to scien-
tific criticism, so long as in the struggle for truth its
upholders slay only with the sword of the spirit and not
with the arm of flesh. To have no opinion and to de-
clare that officially the Societies for Ethical' Culture
do not intend to have an opinion, is not tolerance, but
indefiniteness.
Conventionalism may be a sufficient ratso/i d'etre
for formalities, ceremonies, and customs ; but it is not
a sufficient basis for ethics. And a reformatory move-
ment such as the Societies for Ethical Culture aspire
to inaugurate, cannot take deep root if it is planted
on the stony ground of conventionalism.
The intolerance of the first period is an intolerance
of assumed authority, but the intolerance of the re-
ligion of science— if intolerance it can be called—is
the sovereignty of demonstrable truth. Truth is one
from eternity to eternity, and there is no other truth
beside that one and sole and immutable truth. Truth
is that Deity which suffers no equal. Like Jehovah
in the Decalogue, Truth pronounces as its first com-
mandment : p. c.
"Thou shall have no other gods before me."
CURRENT TOPICS.
The venerable conundrum, " What constitutes a gentleman,"
was recently brought up for answer in an English court, but un-
fortunately, the judicial decision left the problem in its old uncer-
tain state. It appears that a person insured in an Accident In-
surance Company, having been accidentally injured, sued for his
insurance money. His claim was resisted on the ground that in
his application for a policy, he had called himself a " gentleman,"
and as this was a false description, by which the company had
been deceived, the policy was void." It appeared from the evidence
that the plaintiff, although out of business at the time he applied
for the insurance, had formerly been in the habit of earning an
honest living as a tradesman, or merchant, and therefore could
never be a " gentleman " in the legal meaning of the word. The
court, although intimating that "no occupation" would have
been the proper description, declined to pass upon the point, be-
cause the agent of the company, when he gave the policy, knew
all the circumstances, and had even suggested the description
"gentleman"; therefore the company was bound by the action
of its agent, and the policy was good, The plaintiff got a judg-
ment for the amount of his claim, but his narrow escape will make
him careful hereafter not to call himself a " gentleman."
On the trial of Thurtell, sixty or seventy years ago, a witness
testified that he knew the prisoner was a gentleman, " because he
kept a gig. " This reason has never been regarded as decisive,
because not accompanied by proof that he had also lived a life of
idleness. I see from a criticism in Uni/y that Professor Swing in a
late sermon intimated that a gentleman must have some theological
belief, or forfeit the title. He asserted that the ancient epicurean-
ism was "a culture without God, the effort of man to be a gentle-
man " without troubling himself about the creeds, or about ques-
tions of his origin and destiny. The language of the sentiment is
doubtless the Professor's own, but it is hard to believe that the
idea is not a plagiarism from Harry Sullivan, a London street
Arab, who attended the ragged school patronized by Miss Tennant
before she married Stanley. Describing one of her school ex-
aminations, she says, ' ' I asked Harry Sullivan to define a gentle-
man. He replied, not without some fervor, ' Oh ! a fellow who
has a watch and chain, and loves Jesus.' " When properly elab-
orated, amplified, and diluted, Harry Sullivan's definition has an
almost photographic likeness to a description fresh from the pulpit
of Central Music Hall.
Admitting that theological belief is a constituent element in
the composition of a gentleman, must it be orthodox according to
the Christian canons, or will faith in false Gods do ? This prob-
lem is not to be solved in the gloom of the cloister, but in the light
of the living world. For a test, let us apply an actual example
furnished by the Probate Court in London. In September, the
will of Sir Munguldass Nuthoobhoy, a Hindoo millionaire, was
offered for probate in that court. He was a citizen of Bombay,
eminent for his private and public virtues. His life was marked
by industry, philanthrophy, and honesty. He had prospered in
spite of his benevolence, and his estate amounted to 3,435,000
rupees. After providing liberally for his own children, as his duty
was, he took thought for some other people's children, and left
large sums of money to schools, hospitals, and various benevolent
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institutions. All this was highly praiseworthy, and would no doubt
have been placed to the credit side of his account in the books of
the recording angel, but for one theological mistake ; he built a
temple to Siva, the God of his fathers, and he set apart 10,000
rupees " to purchase idols for the same." This very useful and
benevolent man had never made "an effort to be a gentleman
with a culture without God," but his God was worse than none
say the Scribes and Pharisees, for it was a false God, and his wor-
ship was idolatry ; therefore, according to Harry Sullivan, and
other orthodox theologians. Sir Munguldass could not be a "gen-
tleman."
Speaking of wills compels me to acknowledge that they have
a weird and spiritual charm for me. I love to rove among their
avenues and by-ways, to trace in their provisions the features of
the dead. There is a fine character study in wills ; and in their
eccentricities we may learn the influence of wealth upon the souls
of men. Wills are full of ethical problems ; and in a legacy we
may often see the palpitations of a conscience. Searching in the
foliage of a recent will I found a blossom which I thought was
grafted from a Bible tree, " the laborer is worthy of his hire ; "
and the question it suggested was, Does that apply to laborers of
every kind ? Does it include within its justice that large class of
laborers who are uninfluential and unorganized, who do not be-
long to the " Knights," who have no walking delegates, and who
never strike ? I mean horses, oxen, dogs, and toilers of that kind.
This is an ethical problem which deserves more study than it gets,
and which might not have aroused my thought had it not been
forced uppn my notice by this curious "item" in the will of a
certain Mr. Clayton. This is the blossom to which I have re-
ferred. The testator bequeaths the sum of thirty pounds a year,
" for the care and maintenance of the house-dog Marcus Aurelius."
This bequest is not a pension, on which Marcus Aurelius is to live
in laziness, and laugh at other dogs who earn an honest living ; it
is left as wages, for it is provided in the will, that whenever Mar-
cus Aurelius shall for any reason, fail to perform the duties of his
office, the salary shall go to any other competent dog who may be
a successful candidate for the position. At the first view, a
hundred and fifty dollars a year appears to be big wages to pay a
dog for house-watching, especially as he buys no clothes, and has
no rent to pay ; but it is not so very extravagant after all, when
we remember what a policeman gets for the same work, which he
performs not half so well. I think the next " revised version
"
will make more clear the meaning of the scripture, that the laborer
is worthy of his hire.
Judging by the newspapers, the city of Chicago appears to be
afflicted at this moment by two mischievous kinds of citizens, one
that votes too little, and the other too much. The pulpit and the
press ring out vehement appeals to the " better classes " urging
them to vote, and thus counteract the mischievous activity of over
zealous' patriots from the Lakes of Killarney, and the Mediter-
ranean sea. It is claimed that some of these invaders are too
public spirited for the common good, and that they are altogether
too loyal to- the American ballot system. So ardent is their at-
tachment to American institutions that they commit perjury, in
order to perform, perhaps a little prematurely, the duty of ballot
boxing which the " better classes " neglect. It appears that for
some time past, the courts have been working over time, convert-
ing aliens into voters, intending to make citizens, when we know
that for any patriotic use thousands of them never can be made
citizens in the legal meaning of the word. Partly from the hopper
of the naturalization mill, and partly out of other mills, came
50,000 new voters and put their names on the polling lists at the
registration in October. Simultaneously appeared the United
States marshal and arrested several gangs of them for committing
perjury as the beginning of citizenship, and several other gangs,
the practical statesmen of the town, for suborning them to do so.
Of the 50,000 no less than 25,000 have been notified by the olficers
of election that they are "suspects," and that their right to vote
must be shown by further evidence. Meantime, a call is made on
all good citizens to vote, or for ever hold their peace about bad
government.
The census of iSgo has been vigorously impeached for false-
hood by many cities and towns because the figures made by actual
count fall below the guess work estimates. As the distance
"covered" by some provincial athlete in jumping, pitching, or
throwing, shrinks under the test of a tape line, so the population
of a town as proclaimed by its inhabitants is liable to shrink under
the test of an actual poll. Although an error here or there should
not be received as evidence against its fairness, some ugly
charges have been made that the census is not honest, and that it
has been corrupted and falsified for partisan and political advan-
tage. This accusation had no moral weight ; it was disdainfully
regarded as part of that humorous mendacity essential to a polit-
ical campaign. It was neither circumstantial, nor specific, and it
had no responsible authority behind it ; but that is not so now
;
it is indorsed and guaranteed by no less a personage than the
Governor of New York. In a speech made by him at Canton, Ohio,
the Governor said ; "The census has been manipulated for count-
ing the republican populations up and the democratic populations
down." This is either true or false; if true the census returns are
a worthless complication of perjuries and frauds; if false, the
slander is as wicked as the crime charged, and unless the gov-
ernor can prove his accusation, the " effete monarchies " of the
old world will wonder what soi t of people are employed for gov-
ernors in the state of New York. M. M. Trumbull.
CORRESPONDENCE.
SOLIPSISM AND MONISM.
7;> Ihf Ec/i/orof The Open Cnirt:—
" The tides of philosophic thought are setting toward unity,"
is the first sentence and the key-note of the able article on " Pos-
itive Idealism " in T/if Open Coiirl of September 25. This, of
course, is the key-note of your valuable journal. In the logical
meaning of unity this is a logical necessity, for all truth must lie
consistent with all other truth ; and so the totality of all truth is
a logical unity. On this there can be no question or doubt.
But I understand that the monism advocated by Tlw Open
Court is a more ulterior unity than this ; that it is the affirmation
of the essential identity of all being and the ultimate unity and
harmony which are implied in its action ; and that hence there
follows a moral law of universal obligation, to act for the whole
as parts of the whole. This monism, I think, cannot be made to
square with any form of psychological idealism ; for they all make
all the known and knowable world of sense purely subjective, an
evolution from and in the subject, though this evolution is sup-
posed to be aided by an inconceivable something from beyond
this known sense world. The monism of The Open Court, it I un-
derstand it, makes the known and knowable world an essential
part of the total monus from which man and all inferior life are
evolved and into which all known individual forms of life are re-
.disjolved. If this is so, this monism has to settle with modern
psychology which is idealistic, and this psychology is now widely
taking possession of common and popular thinkers. The issue
here involved is fundamental, and no theory of monism can evade
or ignore it ; and your excellent contributor, Mr. McCrie, will
here need to explain himself further as an idealist.
As an idealist Mr. McCrie says truly : " The ego is not the
bodily organism alone. The true, the only ego—is the subject
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self projected so as to include the objective." This extension of
the ego as conscious subject cannot be limited in any direction—
if all phenomena are subjective states or conscious moods of the
ego. Then I, the conscious ego or subject am wherever there is
a phenomenon—nay I comprise that phenomenon in every case.
It is I and I am it. It is I in that said mood. I thus constitute the
entire known and knowable universe, and all its known and know-
able forces, for these cannot be directly known or conceived ex-
cept as they are known or conceived as phenomenal, at least in
their manifestation, and it is only their manifestation which is
directly known. There is nothing known from which this uni-
verse can be evolved—except myself, conscious subject. This I
know ; and according to this theory I know it as comprising the
universe ; and all the known evolutions and involutions of the
universe are known only as the variations of my own mind or uni-
tary power of conscious life. T/ius /am l/ie kt.1.. I know nothing
unconscious, and no other consciousness than my own or myself.
These phenomena are not abstractions, and my conscious
self is not an abstraction. If psychological idealism be true there
is no room for any other monism than solipsism— unless it be a
very different monism from that of 77;,- Oprii Court, and attained
by a far less simple and direct process, as it seems to me. On
these points I should be pleased to hear from Dr. Cams as well as
Mr. McCrie. Yours Inquiringly, ^
Wm. J. Gill.
[Since I read Mr. McCrie's article in No. i6i of The Open
Court, and Miss Naden's essays,* I am under the impression that
the differences between Solipsism and the Monism of The Open
Court are mainly verbal. It may be that I misinterpret Dr.
Lewins, the founder of Solipsism, for the problems are so very
subtile that we have to ascertain the exact meaning of every con-
cept which we introduce in our reasoning and it is not a mere
phrase when Prof. Clifford says ;
"The question is one in which it is peculiiiily di&cult to make out pre-
cisely what another man means, and even what one means oneself."
Mr. McCrie, the philosophic thinker of the Orkney Islands,
is an intimate friend of Dr. Lewins. He as well as Miss Naden
can be considered as faithful representatives of Solipsism.
Now I find that Dr. Lewins and his adherents use an entirely
different terminology than we do. There is, for instance, a tree
seen. That part of the process (viz., of the tree being seen) which
(as science informs us) consists of certain nervous disturbances in
the brain accompanied with a special kind of consciousness is
commonly called "a sensation," and that part from which the
rays of light proceed is called " an object." Dr. Lewins appears
to include in the term sensation the objective thing that causes the
sensation. He calls object that something which is projected by
our senses to a place outside our body.
There are in the domain of objects motions sensorily per-
ceived to take place and there are other motions (viz., those in the
brain) which (although not always directly perceived) are for cer-
tain scientific reasons assumed to take place. Some motions (viz.,
some of those taking place in the brain) are not mere motions,
they postess in addition a certain something called feeling.
There are accordingly objects and subjective representations
of objects forming analogues of the objects. We will call the
former the domain of objectivity, the latter the , domain of sub-
jectivity. The difficulty that presents itself is to draw a line of
demarcation between subjectivity and objectivity.
The objective process of motion does not cease when passing
into the spectator's eye. The motions that take place within the
brain, are according to our usage of terms objective processes just
as much as all other motions, and I prefer to confine the domain
"Induction and Deduction and other Essays," by Constance C. W.
of subjectivity to the feeling alone. Yet I am aware of the fact
that neither subjectivity nor objectivity exist by themselves ; they
are abstract conceptions which are arrived at by a most compli-
cated process of thinking. They have been abstracted from Re-
ality which is one inseparable whole.
Philosophy and the sciences are at work to describe the whole
of reality, the domain of objectivity as well as that of subjectivity
in their interconnection,* and it is at once apparent that this de-
scription can be made in different terms. Two descriptions made
in different terms may be equally correct. They may apparently
contradict one another, and yet their actual meaning may be one
and the same.
I will call attention here to Mr. McCrie's proposition that
man's ego is not limited to his body ; the objects belong to it ;
and certainly man's body and the objects around him are one in-
separable whole. His lungs as they are cannot exist one millionth
part of a second without the surrounding air and the pressure of
the atmosphere. Exactly so his brain and the ideas that are
registered in his brain exist, as they are only on account of the
surrounding world. The surrounding world in this sense is an
actual part of man's existence.
Dr. Lewins and Mr. McCrie emphasize this truth in their
terminology. All the critical remarks which Dr. Lewins has made
on the views presented in 77;*' Open Court seem (in my mind) to
arise from the difference of terminology. He calls " ego " that
which we call " the All," and thus it is quite natural for him to
say, the ego alone is God.
I cannot agree with Dr. Lewins in the acceptability of his
terms, but that is another question.
My opinion that the most flagrant discrepancies are merely
verbal, that they ultimately rest npon a difference of terms, has




* This subject has been discussed in my article " The Orisin of Mind,"
published in T/ie Monist, No. i.
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